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Introduction
Environmental taxes seem to be an attractive instrument to enhance environmental quality
without seriously damaging the growth possibilities. By increasing environmental taxes
to curb pollution and using the revenues to cut distortionary taxes on income, it may be
possible to obtain a "double dividend", i.e. not only a better environmental standard, but
also a less distortionary tax system, thereby improving economic welfare. However, some
authors interpret "double dividend" differently.' Goulder (1994) and Christiansen (1996)
discuss different interpretations and definitions of the term "double dividend", and give an
overview of the literature.
The recent literature on environmental taxation and the double dividend, shows that
in a second best economy with other distortionary taxes and a revenue requirement. the
optimal tax will in general deviate from the pigouvian tax2 , see e.g. Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994a) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994a,b). Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1994a,b) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a) find it optimal to cut the labour tax in
response to increased concern for environmental quality, using static general equilbritim
models with endogenous labour supply and a clearing labour market. In their analyses
employment and welfare decline, rejecting the double dividend hypothesis. This conclusion
may be modified when introducing wage rigidity causing involuntary unemployment. see
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1993, 1994c, 1996).
In a static model framework with involuntary unemployment, Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1993,1994c) find that a shift in the tax burden away from labour towards other
resources has a positive effect on employment, obtaining an employment double dividend
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) explores the effects of an environmental tax reform on
pollution, economic growth and welfare in an intertemporal general equilibrium rnodel u it h
economy-environment-economy linkages for a closed economy with no labour input in the
production. An environmental tax reform may raise economic growth by reducing t hr en-
vironmental production externality, which has a positive effect on the productivity of (
tal. Sorensen et al. (1994) use an intertemporal general equilibrium model (with ecoliurns -
environment-economy linkages) for a closed economy with wage rigidity caused 1)
wage setting, when analysing the effects of environmental taxation. Higher emission tav,
combined with a lower tax burden on labour income, support both an employment and a
welfare double dividend, they claim, since the effects on consumption and growth may
be positive.'
In this paper both the dynamics of endogenous capital accumulation and involuntary
unemployment due to wage rigidity, are implemented in the model framework of a small
1 Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1993, 1994a, b) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a) use the expression
"employment double dividend" when an environmental tax reform has a positive effect on employment and
the environment, but not necessarily on total welfare.
2 The pigouvian tax is discussed in e.g. Sandmo (1975).
3
 See Goulder (1995) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) for numerical analyses of environmental tax
reforms using intertemporal general equilibrium models.
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open economy, when analysing the total welfare effects of a unilateral increase in the tax on
fossil fuels. Combustion of fossil fuels is an important source of environmental pollution.The
tax revenue is rebated through reductions in other taxes. There is no economy-environment-
economy feedbacks in the model, and hence no optimisation of the fossil fuel tax rate. This
implies that only the non-environmental welfare costs are analysed. The intertemporal
model pictures a small open economy producing a product which is an imperfect substi-
tute for foreign goods as in Bye and Holmoy (1992) and Bye (1995). This formulation
deviates from the traditional model of a small open economy where the prices are fixed
at the world market, see e.g. Sen and Turnovsky (1989) for an intertemporal model with
such a characteristic. The alternative assumption adopted in this paper can be justified
for several reasons. Econometric work at an aggregate industry level _often end up with
surprisingly small trade elasticities, see e.g. Lindquist (1993) and Naug (1995). Norman
(1990) criticises the Armington approach as an approximation for oligopolistic structures
and product differentiation which are essentially supply-side effects, by showing that the
Armington approach may give quite different results compared to a model where imperfect
competition is modelled directly on the firm level. On the other hand, Branson (1990) in a
comment to Norman (1990) points out that more competition on the supply side and higher
substitutability on the demand side are themselves substitutes in explaining adjustments to
trade liberalisation.
In the model used in this paper, the introduction of environmental taxation combined
with changes in other taxes, will through their effects on prices and costs, have long term
welfare effects through changing the rate of capital accumulation, employment and eco-
nomic growth. The model differs in a substantial way from the models in Bye and HolmOy
(1992) and Bye (1995) by including labour market imperfections as originally suggested by
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Monopolistic trade unions set the wage level and a fixed
exchange rate implies real wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment', which change both
the properties and the solution of the model, compared to the model in Bye (1995). By
including involutary unemployment, the model is made relevant for a discussion of a possible
employment dividend. 5
The paper analyses tax reforms from an arbitrary initial situation where the intial tax
rates on labour and fossil fuels are not optimised. The existence of a welfare gain of an
environmental tax reform depends on whether the reform reduces other imperfections in the
economy. The imperfections present in the model are related to imperfect competition in
the labour market giving involuntary unemployment, and an unexploited terms of trade gain
due to a declining export demand curve. In addition the taxes are creating distortions in the
use of production factors, and in the distribution of consumption on different commodities.
4
 Hoel (1996) gives a survey over the literature on the effects of tax changes on wage formation and
unemployment. There are some support in the literature for a hypothesis that a wage tax influences the
producers wage costs and hence also the level of unemployment.
5 Andersen (1995) presents an intertemporal model with structural unemployment caused by efficiency
wage setting. He claims that other labour market imperfections such as union wage formation would lead
to approximately the same qualitative results when analysing the effects of fiscal policy.
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The long run effects on instantaneous utility, employment and the stock of real and financial
capital of a revenue neutral increase in the tax on fossil fuels combined with a) lump sum
rebating or b) change in the wage tax, are discussed. In general the total welfare effect is
ambiguous, depending on substitution effects which in the case of a non-optimal initial tax
structure create efficiency losses, income effects from changes in terms of trade, employment,
real capital and net foreign wealth. Due to the changes in instantaneous utility during the
time path following the implementation of the tax reform, the total welfare effect may be
positive even with a reduction in long run consumption. The total welfare effect is in general
more positive (or less negative) with tax reform b) than tax reform a). Hence, there may
exist a welfare double dividend by increasing the tax on fossil fuels, and using the revenue
to reduce the wage tax, which is causing involuntary unemployment. The effect on the long
run level of employment is also more positive with tax reform b).
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the analytical framework. Section
3 describes some of the long run effects of the tax reforms, while section 4 conducts the
corresponding welfare analyses. Section 5 concludes, while some of the technical details are
relegated to the appendices.
2 The model framework
2.1 Technology and preferences
The economy is using two goods which are both used as capital inputs by the firms and
consumed by the households. Good 1 is a composite good of a domestic and a foreign
variety which are imperfect substitutes for each other. The domestic and the foreign va-
rieties compete both on the domestic and on the world market. Good 2, fossil fuels, is
supplied by imports only. All firms have identical linearly homogeneous technology and all
households have identical homothetic preferences. The structure of technology and prefer-
ences is assumed to be separable so that the two goods enter both the production function
and the utility function through a macro commodity. The household preferences and the
production technology are assumed to be similar with respect to the composition of the
macro commodity.6 Due to constant returns to scale and competitive behaviour, the part
of the demand structure that determines the composition of the macro commodity can be
represented in dual terms by the following linearly homogeneous price functions:
(1) Pl
 = picpr Pn
(2) P = P(Pi, P2)
where P2 = P; (1 ± 7). 11 is the world market price of fossil fuels and T denotes the
carbon tax corresponding to the aggregate commodity fossil fuels. The domestic price P i
6
 Taxation of fossil fuels will change the composition of the macro commodity.
5
of the competing commodity is the unit cost of acquiring good 1. It is an ideal price
index of the domestic producer price Pill
 and the price of the competing imports PI. The
price of the macro commodity P is formed in an analogous way and represents an ideal
price index of the price of this competing commodity Pi and the price of fossil fuels P2.
The import prices PI and .P7 are both determined exogenously on the world market. The
exchange rate is fixed to unity and all values are measured in domestic currency. Good 1
consists both of non-fossil energy commodities such as hydro based electricity and other
non-energy commodities, but the energy commodities consitute only a small fraction of the
aggregated good 1. Hence, the substitution possibilities between fossil fuels (good 2) and
good 1 represented by the elasticity of substitution o-12 , are likely to be smaller than the
substitution possibilities between the domestic and foreign variety of good 1, represented
by the elasticity of substitution
 cî/H-
2.2 Producer behaviour
Due to competition among a sufficiently large number of domestic firms, the price of the
domestic product is forced down to equal unit cost. The individual firms are price takers
in all markets and face given time paths of wages w, a world market interest rate r, and
product prices. They rent labour L, but own the capital stock K. Investment, J, is financed
by retained profits. The supply of labour is assumed to be fixed. The labour market is
unionised consisting of n different labour unions representing n different labour skills. This
model of the labour market was originally suggested by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and
is also used by Sorensen et al (1994). The total input of labour consists of the following
CES-aggregate of n different labour skills.
(3)
( n 	 cr —1) 7. L1
L=
 ELi c L
i=i
Li is the input (in hours) of labour skill i and aL is the elasticity of substitution between
labour of any two skills. We assume that aL > 1. The dual unit cost function of the labour
input aggregate is given by
(4) w = E
i=i
Using Shepards lemma on the corresponding labour cost function gives the demand for each
labour skill.
L
(5) Li = ( —Wi)\w
The production function is linearly homogeneous. The decision problem of the representative
firm at time 0 is to choose the time paths of the control variable gross investment so that
the present value of the cash flow, V, is maximised:
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(6) 	V0=
=0
pHLf(k) — P J -rt dt   
subject to
(7) k =
(8) K(0) = K
where K0
 is predetermined so k is backward looking. The transversality condition is given
by
(9) lim e-r t P K 0t-*00
The necessary f. o.c. are
(10) Plink) = (r
(11) p1H [f (k) — k f(k)] w
where P is forward looking.
We may interpret (10) as determining k, while (11) determines PI/ given k and the wag
rate w.
2.3 Union wage setting
The labour market is unionized, with n monopolistic unions of n different labour skills All
workers are organized in unions according to their skill type and are perfectly mobile a( ross
firms, and all unions have the same number of members, M. The assumption of monopolist IC
unions implies that the union in the market for skill i sets the nominal wage ratt ti) the
employers, and the labour demand curve for each skill determines the level of employment
This level of employment is equally shared among all members of the union. Each union si , t,
its wage rate with the aim of maximizing the lifetime utility of its representative niemher
We assume the number of skills (unions) to be large, hence each union has a neglwible
influence on the general wage w and price level, the aggregate level of employnient and
capital accumulation. Following these assumptions and given that there is no disut ilit from
work, the union may maximise the lifetime utility of its representative member by simply
maximising the individual utility during each time period. Since the stock of member!, is
fixed, this is equivalent to maximising the union's utility. It is assumed that it is only t he
total disposable income for the worker that matters (see e.g. Rociseth (1995)). The union
for workers with skill i must thus solve the problem
(12) max w:L i s* (Li —
w i
subject to
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(13.a)	 L(w) = ( utii ) -'LL
(13.b)	 Li <
where
wi(1 — t)
P
w* is the net of tax real wage rate. L i is total employment (in hours) of skill i and L i is union
i's fixed supply of labour (in hours). s* = sl P is the real value of the unemployment benefit
and t is the wage tax. From the first order condition for the union's utility maximisation
we get the following simple wage equation.
ms (14) wi = 	 = w(1 — t)
where m = o-L /(aL — 1). The union will set the nominal wage rate as a mark-up over the
unemployment benefit corrected for taxes. Due to the assumptions of symmetric unions and
a constant elasticity of substitution between different labour skills, the equilibrium wage rate
depends only on exogenous variables and is independent of labour skill. The unemployment
benefit is assumed to be high enough to cause involuntary unemployment Li - L i > 0, in
the model.
2.4 Consumer behaviour
The household sector is described by a large number of atomistic consumers with an infinite
horizon. They are all endowed with labour skill of type i. We assume that there is no disutil-
ity from work and that all consumers are rationed in the labour market. Since all consumers
are rationed in the labour market, total labour supply in the number of work hours L, is
given. Hence, the representative consumer's objective is to maximise total discounted utility
with respect to total consumption C of the macro commodity. Tax revenues are rebated
to the consumer as lump-sum transfers and unemployment benefit. The consumer's income
consists of wage, interest on financial wealth, net cash flow from the firms and transfers from
the government. The wage rate is independent of skill and there is no aggregation problem,
hence the household sector can be described by a representative consumer with an infinite
horizon. The time path of aggregate consumption is determined by solving the following
maximisation problem:
(15) max Uo
 =(c)
subject to the budget constraint:
130° u(Ct )e-Ptdt
(16)	 = rb P111
 Lf(k) — PC — PJ — twL	 — L) S2
=
8
lim bert 0
t-400
b(0) = bo
b is net financial wealth and bo is predetermined. 12 is lump sum transfer from the gov-
ernment. It is standard in the representative agent framework to assume that the agent
being one of a large number of agents, is unable to infer his share of the total tax revenue.
Hence (16) with 12 treated as exogenous, is the budget constraint considered. p is the sub-
jective rate of time preference. Recall that P is determined by (1) and (2) because of the
assumptions of separability in the preference structure. Equation (17) is the transversality
condition.
From the utility maximisation we have the following first order condition:
(19)	 u'c =
P
where
 i is the costate variable associated with the financial wealth accumulation equation
(17). The costate variable evolves according to
(20)
A necessary condition for obtaining a steady state solution is r = p. 7 From the single
country's perspective this is a "razor's edge" requirement as both the interest rate and the
rate of time preference are exogenous in the model of a small open economy. For convenience
it is assumed that the condition holds at all points in time, which implies that tc is constant
over a dynamic path.
We assume the following well known specification of the utility function:
(21.a)
(21.1))
u(C ) = 	  C-7-azI)C ac
O C
—
 1 t
when ac
u(C) = ln Ct 	when ac =1
act is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
From the first order conditions of intertemporal utility maximisation we get the following
simple relationship between consumption and the costate variable p:
(22)	 C = (pP)"
7 The dynamic stability properties of an intertemporal model of a small open economy is discussed in
numerous papers, see e.g. Sen and Turnovsky (1989).
2.5 Equilibrium
The condition for equilibrium in the domestic product market is given by
P	 PI(23) L f (k) = O H (C + kL +	 + A(4)
where OH OR is the total home share of domestic absorption. 0, i = 1,2, are the budget
shares of good 1 and fossil fuels respectively. 91, j = H, I, are the budget shares of the
domestic and imported variety of good 1 respectively. Export demand A is an increasing
function of the ratio of the world market price to the domestic product price. The elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign varieties of good 1 is assumed to be the same
on the domestic market as on the export market. This simplifies the analysis without losing
any main points.
The description of the macroeconomic equilibrium is completed by introducing the gov-
ernment budget constraint. In accordance with standard practice in the theory of domestic
distortions, it is assumed that lump-sum subsidies are available to redistribute tax revenues.
The government's budget is assumed to balance in each period, i.e.
(24) .1);rp(C + J) + twL =	 — L) +
Inserting the government budget constraint into the consumer's budget constraint given in
equation (16) gives
(25)	 b = rb + Pt L f (k) — GC — GJ
where G 111 (AH	 +	 + AP; - 8 G can be interpreted as the price of the domestic
macro commodity exclusive of the tax on fossil fuels. Equation (25) is the current account.
Hence, it is sufficient to impose the transversality condition on the consumer to ensure that
the stock of net foreign wealth does not explode.
The complete macroeconomic equilibrium is thus described by the equations (1), (2),
(10), (11), (14), (17), (22), (23) and (25). The model has a block recursive structure: equa-
tion (14) determines w, then equations (1), (2), (10) and (11) determine P, P1 , Pill and
k, given import prices and the net wage rate. Given the prices consumption follows from
equation (22), and labour demand is determined in (23) by total demand for the domes-
tic product. (25) determines the accumulation of net foreign wealth. The transversality
condition (17) adjusts p such that the net foreign wealth does not explode.
A reduced form of the dynamic equilibrium system is obtained by eliminating P from
equations (1) and (2). P can be replaced by the function P = g (Pr ,
 Pf, P2) = p(pi(Pfl
 , Pn , P2).
We assume for simplicity that the exogenous variables PI, ./1, T and w are constant through
time.
api(pl,pr)8
 The partial derivatives of the price function are defined as aP(aPpi;P2) = pl(P1 , P2 ) and 	apt,	 —
AH (P1 , P11 ) a.s.o.
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Equation 11) give P as a function of k
(11')	 pH1	 f(k)k no,
which holds at all points of time. Thus the dynamics of Pr and k obey
°K=	 *k
ic is the substitution elasticity between labour and capital in the production function, and
OK and OL are the cost shares of capital and labour, respectively.
Inserting the expression for if into equation (10), the dynamic system derived from
(10), (23) and (25) then takes the following form:
(26.a)	 hi(k) CrK k [Pif f i (k) — r 9 (Pi )1OH OK g (Pi )
(26.b) 	h2 (k , L;	 o
pH 	 1
1kg (Pil) f (k)	 — —k [(pg (Pi )) -cc 4- Ii 1 (k)11l
(26.c)	 rb Pill f (k) — G {(Ag(PII )) -cc Lh i (k) kh2 (k, L; /2)]
where the functions h i (k) and h2 (k, L; ki) are defined after substitution of Pill given by (11').
2.6 Equilibrium dynamics
The time path of k can be solved in terms of exogenous variables only from equation (26.a),
when (11') and (14) are taken into account. Inserting the solution into (26.b), yields the time
path for L, conditioned on a constant value of p. Finally b follows from equation (26.c).
However, for an arbitrary value of bt, the resulting accumulation of b will in general be
inconsistent with the transversality condition imposed by (17) and will eventually explode.
The complete equilibrium therefore requires a solution for p that satisfies (17), see e.g.
Sen and Turnovsky (1989) and Brock and Turnovsky (1993) for the same kind dynamic
structure. A special feature of this structure is the path dependency of the stationary
solution. 9
 A closed form solution of the model can therefore only be found in approximate
terms by linearising around the steady state (k, L) solution.
h i Ck) 	c,„„,,j 1,	 (TCThe long run equilibrium is a saddle-point since h ik = o ak 	andLIU /62/3 8h2,L)aL
evaluated at steady state, see appendix A. The stable solution for k in the neighbourhood
of steady state is
(27)	 k(t) = k -i- (k0 — k)ehikt
9 This complicates the analysis substantially compared to Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) and Sorensen
et al (1994) who use closed economy models. In Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) and Sorensen et al (1994)
transitional dynamics are absent. After a policy shock the economy moves immediately to a new steady
state.
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Inserting this into the linearised form of (26.b) (when k = 0 and L = 0) we obtain the stable
solution for L
—(28) L(t) =	 h2k+ L 	  )(k0 — k)ehlkt ,
ftlk	 n2L
where h2k , given in appendix A, is assumed to be negative. To determine the dynamics of
the current account we linearise equation (26.c) around steady state
b = r(b — b) +	 f(k)(L — L)
(29) [p-rLf(T) °071H
	195:(70-12(p2g9(21-51/))2k
	Gc7c)C)] (k k).
Substituting the solution of L from (28) and k from (27) we obtain the following differential
equation in b
(30) b — rb = a(ko — k)eh lk t
where 
-	 h2k
a -a-
	(k) +
	 f (k)( hari
 _ h 1)
ex 15- [_	 6,2	 2
	 A+
crick	 piff (Tun( 	 H.) +(-77ac uZP1 
Assuming that the economy starts out with an initial stock of net financial wealth, b(0) = bo,
the solution to equation (30) is
(31) -b + a(ko — k)ehikt 	[(bo	)	 a(ko — k)] ert-4--=	 b
nlk r	 hik — r
In order for the transversality condition (17) to be satisfied, the last term must vanish,
which implies
(ko — k) (32) bo —	 a
kIti — r
The solution which is consistent with long run solvency is then given by
hik — r
Equation (33) describes the equilibrium relationship between the change in the equilibrium
capital-labour ratio and the change in the equilibrium net wealth of the economy, depending
crucially on the sign of a. Consider the expression for a. The term Pr L fi (k) which
measures the increase in the net product of an increase in k, is positive. The second term
in the expression for a,
	 f (k)  h2kh2L-hik represents the effect of changes in employment of7
an increase in the capital-labour ratio. The term in the last square brackets represents the
terms of trade effect and the direct intra- and intertemporal substitution effects, following
(33) a(ko — k)eh ik tb =b -+
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an increase in the capital-labour ratio. The increase in the capital-labour ratio induces a fall
in the domestic product price, and intratemporal substitution over to domestic production,
in addition to the positive effect on consumption through the intertemporal consumption
function. h2k
 is negative due to these substitution effects. By inserting into the expression
and - 1 ,
h2ki,
1k
 from Appendix A, it can be shown that a < 0, if the substitution effects, which
contribute negatively to a, outweighs the positive effect on the net product of an increase
in k. The substitution elasticities are assumed to be large enough to fulfil this requirement.
a < 0 has the following interpretation: An increase in the capital-labour ratio induces a fall
in the domestic product price and the price fall favours demand for the domestic product,
but implies a loss in terms of trade. Provided that the substitution effects dominate the
terms of trade effect, i.e. the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied, the increase in k has
a positive effect on net foreign wealth. In addition the higher capital-labour ratio has a
positive effect on the demand for labour, see equation (28), even though L is falling as the
economy approaches steady state.
The property of the positive relationship between net foreign wealth and the capital-
labour ratio is the opposite of what is the case in a traditional small open economy model.
With exogenous employment, higher investment in real capital leads to a corresponding
reduction in financial investment and reduces net foreign wealth. Sen and Turnovsky (1989)
modifies this model by assuming endogenous labour supply, but there is still a negative
relationship between the accumulation of real and financial capital. In both Bye and Holmoy
(1992) and Bye (1995) total employment is exogenous, but the small open economy model
is modified by the assumption of the domestic product being an imperfect substitute for the
world market product. The substitution possibility over to domestic production when the
price of the domestic product is reduced following an increase in the capital-labour ratio,
in addition to the terms of trade effect, modify the negative effect on net foreign wealth.
But, there is still an inverse relationship between the accumulation of real and financial
capital. The assumption of involuntary unemployment as modelled in this paper, represents
an additional modification compared to the model presented in Bye and Holmoy (1992)
and Bye (1995), implying a positive relationship between accumulation of real and financial
capital.
The stationary solution of the linearised system is given by the following equations (for
convenience the bar's over the steady state values are omitted in the rest of the paper):
(34.a)
(34.13)
(34.c)
(34.d)    
f (k) — k f' (k) 
r g (Pin = Pi" f' (k) 
pH	 PI
601. g(piH) (L f (k) — A( IS)) = (kg (Pi )) - crc
rb G(P11)(pg(P1-1 )) -uc —	 L f (k)
13
aL	 (ko — k)(34.e)	 b — bo =
r — nik
which determine the steady state values Pf', k, L, b and A.
3 Long run effects of tax reforms
In order to calculate the welfare effects of a tax reform, both short and long run effects
must be found. To derive the long run effects of a domestic tax reform, it is necessary to
find the total logarithmic differentials of the steady state solution (34.a) -(34.e) w.r.t. w and
P2. The domestic tax reforms are assumed to have no influence on international commodity
markets, implying that the foreign prices r, PI and /37 are constant in the analyses. The
expression for consumption C = (pg(11-0) - (7c is substituted in the steady state solution
(34.a) - (34.e). P2 Pff , k, a.s.o. represent the logarithmic derivatives.
(35.a)
(35.b)
(35.c)
ex
H = id)
 _	 fc
ux
=
1	 -	 O L -
—
t9I
(92P2 -i- -
0-K
k)
O H PC	 -L = sIHAH + 812(152 — of' ;./	 Pig X+ 	  — 9
K Ic
(35.d)	 Gct = x(PH L eic) rbl.  — GCO
b(r a—khik) k
(35.e)	 = 	
We have the following definitions;
,,	 A
Si2	 ---)U20-12 > 0, HSIH 	 I=-7.- —(9 1 X + e )alH < 01
	O i (1— O H ),	 X Lf(k),
and the following expressions;
O P= -G [01 151 + 01 92 	 T 0-12(152 61 31.115111 )1,1 -E 
t
	= --o-c(ft + 15), 	 = m t§ -i- 
1 t
t
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01 is the economy's total import share. silt summarises the substitution effects between the
domestic and foreign variety of good 1, and S 12 is the effect on the demand for the domestic
product induced by substitution between fossil fuels and good 1.
The effects of a revenue neutral increase in the domestic tax on fossil fuels	 > 0,
combined with either a) a lump sum transfer or b) a revenue neutral change in the labour
income tax, are analysed.
3.1 Taxation of fossil fuels with lump sum rebating
With tax reform a) we have
•
132 = 1 + 7- 	= 0
The reduced form equations of the differentiated model are given in appendix C. 1° The total
effect on the level of consumption in steady state can be expressed by the following equation
1	 1
A si2PiFIX 	
_ 0Hon
GC[1— OHOK
[elfe2p1H
611	 )	 y -4- )
(36.a)
	
(PL r —altik)rkaK02] P2 PiH
 X .
The effects on steady state consumption of an increase in the tax on fossil fuels 7 can be
divided into income effects due to changes in terms of trade, employment, real capital and
net foreign wealth, and finally substitution effects. Since the tax income is redistributed
lump sum, all other income effects disappear.
Following the increase in the tax on fossil fuels, terms of trade for good 1 are improved
through higher export prices, and the first term within the brackets, OKO2PiHA, is a pos-
itive income effect from the change in these terms of trade. The second effect present in
( 7;77
equation (36.a), s 12Pill X I 	k 0	 ) 	 which we denote the initial tax wedge effect, is the
direct substitution effect on consumption from an increase in P2 relative to the endogenous
adjustment of P1 , due to the increase in r . This effect is larger the larger the substitution
between good 1 and fossil fuels. An increase in the fossil fuel tax brings about substitution
from fossil fuels to good 1. By further reducing the demand for fossil fuels, the efficiency
loss generated by the descrepancy between the marginal willingness to pay for fossil fuels
and the marginal production costs, represented by the world market price for fossil fuel,
increases. This effect is modified through the term 0ti0K, which captures that the price of
good 1 also depends on the price of fossil fuels through the domestic production of capital.
a
This modifies the initial tax wedge effect of an increase in the carbon tax.
The effect represented by the term (PL ,--hik)raKe2k' which is denoted the capital
accumulation term, consists of; (i) the value of the marginal product of capital measured
by PLkr, and (ii) the interest from the capitalised value of the trade surplus generated
10 The calculations of the reduced form equations are available from the author.
15
by an increase in the capital-labour ratio, measured by r"hicik , where h ik takes into account
the adjustment speed of the capital-labour ratio. This gives the total effect on net foreign
wealth. These two effects summarise the net impact of k on the national income induced by
substitution following the rise in P2 which enters the user cost of capital. An increase in the
carbon tax implies a reduction in the capital-labour ratio, see equation (C.3) in appendix
C, implying that the capital accumulation term must be represented in the reduced form
equation for consumption with a negative sign. This has the following interpretation; since
the capital-labour ratio is lower, the returns from both real capital (measured as k) and
financial wealth are reduced, contributing negatively to the stationary level of consumption.
The terms of trade effect, the initial tax wedge effect and the productivity effect from
capital are all present in a situation with exogenous employment, see Bye (1995). With
involuntary unemployment there is in addition a positive income effect on consumption from
the increase in employment. The overall effect on consumption of tax reform a) is larger the
larger the total home share in demand and the share of capital in production. The effects of
the relative price changes are modified since domestic production uses domestic produced
capital as input.
The total effect on employment is given by the following equation
1 (36.b)	 = 	  [(se ucrK)( 1 _ 902H0K ) s12( 1 +1.7.91 )] P2
— oH
where
et-1	 PS	
— S12(
1 ± 791
) Of	 <O11
and
rak \9K (1 — O H E) + GH 	G XG'r — h ik )
	Consider first the last term in the brackets in equation (36.b),	 This expresses the
direct positive substitution effect over to good 1 when the price on fossil fuel increases,
which implies higher demand for the domestic product and labour for a given home share
of good 1. The effect is modified by the initial fossil fuel tax and the budget share of good
1 in demand. The initial tax rate induces an efficiency loss, modifying the positive effect on
the demand for labour.
The effect of the fossil fuel tax on the capital-labour ratio is negative. A reduction in
the productivity of labour induces an increase in the domestic product price, reinforcing the
rise in the price of the macro good and the user cost of capital. These effects are accounted
for by the first two terms in (36.b). The first term in S, sm , is the substitution effect
between the domestic and the foreign variety of good 1, which is negative. An increase in
the domestic product price following a tax on fossil fuels implies substitution away from the
11 C' APSIH .912k1 AH XG
	 1	 Off Paul — goo— f OH N12k 1 + ,0 i )	 0
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domestic variety both on the domestic and export market. This contributes to a reduction
oHin labour demand. The second term in S, —8 12( 17,t), reflects that an increase in the
domestic product price, following a higher fossil fuel tax, induces an increase in the price
of good 1 and brings about substitution to good 2. This effect modifies the direct positive
substitution effect on good 1 and contributes negatively to the level of employment. The
last term in S, 0 11 5 14, represents the terms of trade effect. The positive income effect
following an increase in terms of trade implies higher demand for the macro commodity for
consumption and investment purposes, and hence has a positive effect on the demand for
the domestic product and labour.
The term 7Ko-K represents the effect of a change in the capital-labour ratio on labour
demand. The last term in 7K represents the effect on the demand for the domestic product
and labour of the change in net foreign wealth generated by a change in the capital-labour
ratio. Since a < 0, this effect is negative and increases with the total home share. OK
represents the direct contribution of the reduced capital-labour ratio on the demand for
labour. The second term in PyK is divided by total production, and it is assumed that the
direct effect from the change in the capital-labour ratio dominates, such that 7K is positive.
This implies that the reduction in the capital-labour ratio following a carbon tax increase,
has a positive effect on employment. The same effects are present in the reduced form
equation for the stock of real capital, see equation (C.4) in appendix C. The stock of real
capital is reduced by the tax reform, implying lower savings in both real- and financial
capital. The total effect on employment is increasing in the total home share of domestic
absorption. The term 1-oH is then interpreted as an activity multiplier.-6-
It may be optimal to impose an export tariff in a model where there are possibilities of
obtaining terms of trade gains, see Dixit (1985) and Vennemo (1992) for both a theoretical
and empirical exposition. In the model presented in this paper there are substitution possi-
bilities both between good 1 and fossil fuels and between the domestic and foreign varieties
of good 1. The existence of these substitution possibilities implies that it is not equivalent
to impose an export tariff on the domestic product instead of the carbon tax. If there is
no carbon tax initially, r = 0, P = G and P2 = dr, the initial tax wedge effect in equation
(36.a) disappears, and the total effect on consumption is more likely to be positive. The
trade off between a possible terms of trade gain and the efficiency loss from the initial tax
wedge is discussed in Bye (1995).
To summarise, the long run effects on both consumption and employment are uncertain.
The existence of unexplored market power on the export market, implies that it is possible to
obtain a positive effect on long run consumption of an increase in the carbon tax combined
with lump sum rebating of the tax revenue through a positive terms of trade effect. The
intratemporal substitution effects following the increase in the domestic product price reduce
the demand for the domestic product and labour. The initial carbon tax rate contributes
negatively to consumption through the initial tax wedge term. The income effects from
lower capital-labour ratio and net foreign wealth, contribute negatively to the steady state
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level of consumption, but lower capital-labour ratio has a positive effect on employment.
The use of a dynamic model with endogenous accumulation of capital and the possibility
of a terms of trade gain modify the results in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b) where
an environmental tax reform in a small open economy framework with no possibilities of
obtaining terms of trade gains, had a negative effect on employment.
3.2 Taxation of fossil fuels combined with changes in the labour
income tax
Consider now the effects on employment and welfare of tax reform b) where
P2 	 • f ,1 -1- T- 	1 — t
For simplicity P2 and it) are used in the reduced form expressions. The logarithmic dif-
ferentiated government's budget balance (equation (24)) is given by (when š = 0, (2	 0,
1+, 7 152 )
(37) th 	1	 T=	 tW)LL 	 02PC 61
 4- 10521 < 0,
Kt	 1 + T
where
02 ,512 
kt 	 )(
	
1 T 1
 — OHOK
)] wL> 	 0,
T	 1 — OK
KT 02PC [1  
	
—- 
U12( 	 -	 >1 -I T	 1 OH OK 	o.
Both Kt and KT are positive. They represent the direct effects on the governmental income
of a partial increase in t and T respectively. KT is increasing in the value of consumption,
which is the only base for this tax in the steady state. The second term in KT captures the
effect of adjustment of the tax base; increased carbon tax makes consumers substitute good
1 for fossil fuels.
The overall effect on the wage tax includes the adjustment in the tax bases of employment
and consumption. It is assumed that the initial equilibrium in the economy is on the
upward-sloping parts of the Laffer curves for both the labour tax and the fossil fuel tax.
The additional public revenue from carbon taxation thus allows for a reduction in the wage
tax rate. The reduction in the wage tax rate is smaller the larger the initial wage tax
base, reducing the effects of the tax reform. To find the overall effects on employment
and consumption of such a revenue neutral tax reform, equation (37) is inserted into the
reduced form equations (C.1) and (C.2). The effect on the capital-labour ratio follows then
from equation (C.3). Consider first the effects on consumption, which are given in equation
(38.a).
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1	 a
7w = Kt(1 9119K)
 [19L, (PA piffxsi2 
1
	 )) -1-- (PL
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)rlvcr K61 > 0
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1	 1	 K- O #9 1 1
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K
T )( T1 - OH OK 	Or.	 Kt 1 ± T
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	(9K92 9L -1-K PiH A
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r nik
	 Kt
The term Ac represents the total effect on consumption of changes in both P2 and w, see
equation (C.2) in appendix C. Compared to reform a), all the same effects are present,
but there are additional effects from the term La which represents the relation between
the carbon tax's and the wage tax's direct revenue raising device, i.e. the direct effect on
the wage tax rate. The larger Lsr-, the larger the fall in the wage tax rate, partially. This
term contributes to reduce the positive terms of trade effect12 , and increase the effect of
the initial tax wedge and the income effect from the capital-labour ratio. The reduction
in the wage tax rate contribute to a reduction in the domestic product price and the price
of good 1, compared to tax reform a). This induces additional substitution over to good
1, and strenghtens the efficiency loss of the initial carbon tax. An increase in the carbon
tax implies a terms of trade gain through the increase in the domestic product price, but a
reduction in the wage tax contributes negatively to such a terms of trade gain by lowering
the domestic product price. From equation (C.3) it follows that a reduction in the wage rate
implies further reduction in the capital-labour ratio, compared to tax reform a), contributing
negatively to the net income effect of the capital-labour ratio (the capital accumulation
term).
 Ltc is negative if the initial tax wedge effect and the effect of the capital-labour ratio
outweighs the terms of trade effect.
Whether the long run effect of the tax reform on consumption is positive or negative,
depends in addition on the general equilibrium effect from employment which is also modified
compared to reform a) by the term ey,„(s tw), following from the assumption of revenue
neutrality of the tax reform. yip represents the direct effect on consumption of an increase
in the wage rate, see equation (C.2). This term consists also of the three effects; the terms
of trade effect, the initial tax wedge effect of the fossil fuel tax which is positive with an
increase in the wage rate since the domestic product price increases, giving substitution from
good 1 to fossil fuels, and the total effect of an increase in the capital-labour ratio on the net
national income. This last effect comes into the reduced form equation (C.2) with a positive
12 1t can be shown that 9K92 — OL Liz- is positive.Kt
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sign since a wage increase has a positive effect on the capital-labour ratio (see equation
(C.3)). It follows that the term 7„, contributes negatively to the level of consumption since
the wage rate is reduced.
The effects on the level of employment is given by
1 [(s (929K 	eL) 7K0.K (92 + ZeI))
/YL, \	 kt
Kt
(38 b)
	
1	 2P(SOL
 7KaKei) ( 
1 --I-- r)G TO2P7w Ac)
Te 
. 
where
i 	 fl
6,H09 + 812
1
_ 0H 9K1
9H ' SOL — 7Ko-KOI (702Pill X + L(s +tw)(1+ 7)G)Pur
 1 — 19 G (1-0HO-9k t 	(1+ ir)G + 702 PN,
Compared to reform a), all the same effects are present, but there are additional effects
from the
 term'- which contribute to reduce the negative intratemporal substitution effects,kt
represented by S, since the reduction in the wage tax contribute negatively to the domestic
product price. The positive effect of a reduction of the capital-labour ratio represented
by 7K0-K , is reinforced through the additional negative wage rate adjustment. The direct
positive substitution effect of the carbon tax on the domestic product and employment,
ii1.72-07 , is unchanged. The term in the denominator, wir is assumed to be positive (but is less
than 1), contributing to reinforcing the effects on employment. Compared to tax reform a),
the total effect on employment of these three first terms in equation (38.b), is more likely
to be positive.
In the last term in equation (38.b), the term (SOL
 — wcaK9 -1 ) < 0, represents the direct
effect on employment of a change in the wage rate, see equation (C.1) in appendix C.
The effect is multiplied by the total effect on consumption of changes in both P2 and w,
represented by the term Ac , following from the assumption of revenue neutrality of the tax
reform. The positive effect on employment is modified if Ac is negative. This points to the
possible tax base erosion effect of the carbon tax. If the increase in the carbon tax actually
leads to a reduction in consumption, the possible reduction in the wage tax is smaller, having
a negative effect on employment. It is not possible to have multiple increases in the tax rate
on fossil fuels which are neutralised with reductions in the wage tax rate, since the effect on
the tax revenue may become negative, i.e. the tax-base erosion effect of the fossil fuel tax
will dominate.
Compared to tax reform a) with lump sum rebating, the positive effect on employment
is larger with tax reform b), but the lower capital-labour ratio contributes negatively to
the long run level of consumption through the capital accumulation term. The stock of
real capital is further reduced, see equation (C.4). 13 Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994c)
using a static model framework with involuntary unemployment due to wage rigidity, obtain
a positive effect on both employment and consumption of a similar kind of tax reform, if
13 h is assumed that the positive substitution effects over to good 1 do not outweigh the negative substi-
tution effects, both due to substitution over to the imported variety of good 1 and to labour.
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the resource tax as they call it, is not too high initially. By using a dynamic model with
endogenous capital accumulation, it is shown that an environmental tax reform will have
long term effects on the level of consumption through the change in the capital-labour
ratio and the stock of net foreign wealth, which modifies the positive long run effect on
consumption. This effect is absent in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994c). Sorensen et al
(1994) find support for a double dividend hypothesis (positive effects on both employment,
growth and consumption) in an intertemporal model with involuntary unemployment for a
closed economy. This conclusion is modified by using an intertemporal model for an open
economy where both savings in real and financial capital are reduced. This highlights the
need to take into consideration the dynamic effects from changes in capital accumulation
and long run production possibilities, when evaluating environmental tax reforms.
4 Welfare effects of tax reforms
To analyse the total welfare effects of a tax reform in a dynamic model implies computation
of the entire time path of instantaneous utility of the representative agent, see e.g. Brock
and Turnovsky (1993). The representative consumer's instantaneous utility at time t. ZI i 1.
is defined as
(39.a)	 Z(t) = u(C)
and the overall level of welfare
(39.b)
00
W = f u(C t)e 	
00
- tdt 	 z(t) -rtdt
To be able to analyse the welfare effects of the tax reforms, it is necessary to linearise
(39.a) around its steady state level, substitute the linearised expression into moat itin
(39.b) and integrating, to find an approximate measure of the welfare of the repre,cm,i-
tive consumer. The utility function is specified in equation (21.a) and the correspondi ti
consumption function is given in equation (22). The marginal utility of wealth. p. a I:u
instantaneously to a new constant level following changes in the other variables. Equal i
(11) and (14) give PI' as a function of k when the exogenous variables are constant t hr ..ti i;
time. Hence, P is a function of k, and from equation (22) it follows that the adjustnient in I,
around steady state determines the adjustment in consumption and then Z(t) around st ea(17,
state. Using equation (27), the transitional path of Z(t) may be linearly approximated by
(40.a)	 Z(t)	 u(C) co(ko — k)eh ik t
where
- 	 > 0
0" k
w is constant since it is only a small area around the steady state solution that is considered.
- (7C -- 1 elleK
w u C g P k = acC c
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Inserting equation (40.a) into equation (39.b) and integrating, gives the linear approxi-
mation for W.
— k(40.b)	 W u(0) + w( ko
r 	 r 
— hik
The first term in equation (40.b) represents the consumer's utility if the steady state level
of consumption was attained instantaneously. The second term reflects the adjustment
towards this level due to the fact that the steady state is reached only gradually along the
transitional path.
Taxation of fossil fuels
To derive the total welfare effects of a domestic tax reform, it is necessary to find the
total logarithmic differentials of equations (40.a) and (40.1D). The expressions are given by
12(t) = [ "- ( 1 )6", wehiktkk]C
By using the reduced form expressions for
 C and k given in section 3.1. with lump sum
rebating, or in section 3.2. with a change in the wage tax, the total welfare effects can be
analysed. Tax reform a) is used as an example, but the interpretations are easily extended
to incorporate the effects of tax reform b).
Equation (41.a) gives the effect of a tax on fossil fuels on the level of instantaneous
welfare Z(t). Using equation (C.3) it is easily seen that an increase in the tax on fossil fuels
> 0 reduces the steady state level of capital per labour unit, i.e. k < O. An increase in the
tax on fossil fuels will have the following effects on the short run (t 0) and steady-state
(t oo) levels of instantaneous utility.
(42.a) 2(0) = ro cL5-g-,1) 0 _ wkki
(42.b) Z(oo) = crc C
From equations (42.a) and (42.1D) it is easily seen that
2(0) > 2(t)> 2(oo),
independent of whether the steady state effect on consumption is positive or negative. This
implies that instantaneous utility follows a downward sloping path as illustrated in figure 4.1.
Following an initial jump in instantaneous utility initiated by the tax reform, it will gradually
adjust to the new steady state level. The shaded areas are the change in instantaneous utility
discounted, i.e. the total welfare effect. Along the path the capital-labour ratio is reduced,
tw- C w(	 )kk- 	 - 1
-
-0(-5T )
r — nik
-
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lowering the share of investment in total demand. This gives more room for consumption.
On the other hand a lower capital-labour ratio has a negative effect on production, which
gives less room for consumption in steady state.
The total welfare effect given by equation (41.b) shows that the welfare effect may
be positive even with a negative steady state effect on consumption. The second term
within the brackets represents the effect of the reduction in the capital-labour ratio along
the path towards steady state. The reduction in the capital-labour ratio is accompanied
by a reduction in net foreign wealth, which changes proportionally to the capital-labour
ratio in the neighbourhood of the steady state. This give room for a slowdown in the
fall in consumption along the path. Discounting a transitional path with a higher level of
consumption and instantaneous utility along the path may give a positive welfare effect and
supports the double dividend hypothesis even if the steady state effect on instantaneous
utility is negative, as in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. Welfare effects of an environmental tax reform
Z(0)
Time
The total welfare effect of tax reforms a) and b), depends on the long run effects on both
the capital-labour ratio and the level of consumption. The capital-labour ratio is reduced
under both reforms, with the largest reduction under tax reform b). This has a positive
impact on both instantaneous utility and total welfare, which is largest with reform b). The
long run effect on consumption is more uncertain. As the discussion in section 3.1 of tax
reform a) states; if the effect on employment is negative, the effect on the long run level
of consumption is also negative, contributing negatively to both instantaneous utility and
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total welfare. But even with a reduction in the long run level of consumption, the total
welfare effect may be positive due to the positive effects on instantaneous utility along the
transitional path. With tax reform b) the effect on employment is also likely to be positive.
By using the terminology introduced by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1993), both the
employment double dividend and the welfare double dividend may be obtained with tax
reform b) .
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the effects of green tax reforms on a small, open economy producing
an imperfect substitute for foreign goods. The model is based on intertemporal optimisation,
and union wage setting and a fixed exchange rate imply wage rigidity and involuntary
unemployment. The long run effects on instantaneous utility, employment and the stock of
real and financial capital, of a revenue neutral increase in the tax on fossil fuels combined
with a) lump sum rebating or b) change in the wage tax, are discussed. In general the
total welfare effect is ambiguous, depending on substitution effects which in the case of a
non-optimal initial tax structure create efficiency losses, and income effects from changes
in terms of trade, employment, reà1 capital and net foreign wealth. Due to the changes in
instantaneous utility during the time path following the implementation of the tax reform,
the total welfare effect may be positive even with a reduction in long run consumption. The
total welfare effect is in general more positive (or less negative) with tax reform b) than
tax reform a). Hence, there may exist a welfare double dividend from increasing the tax
on fossil fuels, and using the revenue to reduce the wage tax, which is causing involuntary
unemployment. The effect on the long run level of employment is also more positive with
tax reform b) .
The model presented in this paper represents the most stylised version of a model in-
corporating; i) intertemporal dynamics, ii) involuntary unemployment, iii) open economy
and iv) imperfect substitution between products from different countries. The assumption
of imperfect substitutes is a commonly used specification of many empirical short, medium
and also long term economic analyses. An intertemporal analysis will also depend on the
short term effects, implying that it is necessary to incorporate the assumption of imperfect
substitutes in an intertemporal model if it is a part of the short term analysis. This paper
illustrates that such an extension of the small open economy framework complicates the
effects and interpretation of an environmental tax reform substantially.
Compared to other analytical studies of environmental tax reforms and the double div-
idend issue, this paper's major contribution in addition to the assumption of imperfect
substitutes between the domestic and foreign variety, is the dynamic model framework,
which makes it possible to analyse the time path of instantaneous utility. The short and
long term effects may be different for the two tax reforms considered, implying that it is
important to evaluate both the short and long run implications of a suggested environmental
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tax reform. The literature on gradual reforms of taxation, see e.g. Dixit (1985), gives no
general rules for the effects of tax reforms when there are existing distortionary taxes. As
quoted from Dixit (1985); "The welfare effect of any primary reform, will depend crucially
on the other elements of the whole reform package. In practice each application must be
examined on its own." The analysis presented in this paper points to many important effects
which clearly will affect the economy if an environmental tax reform is implemented, even
if the conclusions are somewhat unclear. There is then a need for numerical simulations to
be able to give more strong conclusions on the welfare effects of environmental tax reforms.
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Appendix A
The derivatives of the dynamic system (26.a)-(26.c) in steady state are given by the
following expressions:
(A.1) r hik
	
(1 — 011 0K ) <7-7 OHOK
(A.2) hu, = 0
(A.3)
h2k =--aK
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h2k can be positive/negative.
(A.4) h2L 	 > 0OHOK
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Appendix B
Due to the recursive structure of the model, the price expectations are substituted with
changes in the capital stock, which is backward looking. Hence, the level of employment
is also backward looking. The dynamic adjustments of k and L can be described by a
phase diagram of the dynamic system (26.a) and (26.b). In section 2.6 it is shown that this
dynamic system has the property of saddle-point stability, irrespective of the real value of
the marginal utility pt. We denote the loci generated by setting k = 0 in (26.a) and L = 0 in
(26.b) as locus A and B respectively. The slopes of these two loci are based on the steady
state values of the derivatives which enter the dynamic system.
Inserting equation (35.a) and the expression for O into equation (35.13) gives the following
equation for the k = 0 locus
(B.1) 1	 OL	 02—(6)K 	= — F152
UK
It is easily seen from equation (35.b) that the k = 0 locus is vertical in the point rg =
f(k) on the k-axis in the L, k-diagram.
Inserting equations (35.a), (35.d) and (35.e) into equation (35.c) gives the slope of locus
B.
(B.2) (1 — —G )L =
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Locus B is upward sloping in the L, k-diagram if the negative term S5-:-, 14 outweighs the
positive term ow. The absolute value of the elasticity of L w.r.t. k is larger the larger is the
marginal elasticity of capital measured by the cost share of capital (in the neighbourhood
of steady state), and the larger are the intratemporal substitution possibilities represented
by the terms s/H and 812. If the intratemporal substitution effects are not large enough to
outweigh the positive term 7K , the slope of locus B is negative.
The two loci are presented in figures B.1 and B.2. The saddle path is denoted SS.
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Figure B.1. Phase diagram
"Small" intratemporal substitution effects.
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Figure B.2. Phase diagram
"Large" intratemporal substitution effects.
L
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Appendix
 C
The reduced form equations for L, k and C can be derived from (35.a) - (35.e ) and the
expression for O. The reduced form equations of L, O and k are given by
1 )P2K ey.KaK) ( 1
_610	 2 + 8122H9K) P
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(where (C.1) can be substituted for L), and
(C.3) k = 
 — eHeK [91 — 92 152]
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The reduced form equation for the stock of real capital, fc, is then given by
(	 \
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